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Khanna v. Microdata Corp.:
The Continuing Evolution of
Wrongful Discharge
In Khanna v. Microdata Corp.,' the California Court of Appeal
for the First District held an employer liable in tort for violating the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.2 Microdata discharged
an employee in retaliation for the employee bringing a lawsuit against
Microdata.3 Khanna extended the precedent set in Cleary v. American
Airlines, Inc.4 in which the court found an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing in the employment contract.' Cleary held that
lengthy satisfactory employment together with the existence of a com-
pany policy regulating dismissals were the two critical factors that
gave rise to a duty not to discharge except for good cause.6 The court
found that these two factors acted as a form of estoppel precluding
termination except for good cause.7 The Cleary court also found that,
in the circumstances involved in that case, an unjust termination
violates the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing contained
in every employment contract.' Further, Cleary concluded that breach
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing would sound in tort
and in contract. 9 The court in Khanna broadened the cause of action
for wrongful discharge based upon the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing by eliminating the requirement of the two critical
factors relied upon by the Cleary court.10
Part I of this note summarizes the facts of Khanna and reviews
the opinion of the court." Part II discusses the legal background of
wrongful discharge actions based upon breach of the implied cove-
1. 170 Cal. App. 3d 250, 215 Cal. Rptr. 860 (1985).
2. Id. at 258, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 864.
3. Id. at 264, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
4. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980). See infra notes 62-66 and accom-
panying text; infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
5. Id. at 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
6. Id. at 455-56, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
7. Id. at 456, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
8. Id. at 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
9. Id. at 456, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
10. See Khanna, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 262, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
11. See infra notes 14-49 and accompanying text.
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nant of good faith and fair dealing.' 2 Finally, Part III of this note
examines the legal ramifications of the Khanna opinion.' 3
I. THE CASE
A. The Facts
In July 1978, Nand Khanna was a salesman employed by Itel.' 4
Richard Manuel, an acquaintance of Khanna, was branch manager
of a Microdata Corporation sales office.' 5 Manuel offered Khanna
the sales account for Van Waters and Rogers as an inducement for
Khanna to leave Itel to join Microdata. 16 This offer was confirmed
in a letter from Manuel, dated July 12, 1978, which included a descrip-
tion of the commission arrangement that would accompany the
account. I
Khanna left the employ of Itel to join Microdata because of the
inducements offered by Microdata.' 8 During his first few months
employment with Microdata, Khanna spent time working on the Van
Waters and Rogers account.'9 Eventually, Khanna was directed to cease
work on the account because other arrangements had been made for
the sale.2" Khanna stopped work on the account, but inquired about
his commission due under the compensation plan contained in the
letter from Manuel. 2' Manuel attempted to get some compensation
for Khanna for time and effort expended on the Van Waters and
12. See infra notes 50-89 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 90-105 and accompanying text.
14. Khanna, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 253, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 861. The facts of this note are
taken from the court of appeals decision that viewed the facts most favorably to Khanna. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 253-54, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 861. Van Waters and Rogers was a large consulting
firm that negotiated with Microdata for the purchase of several computers. Van Waters and
Rogers was expected to purchase from 13 to 15 Microdata computers, bringing Microdata over
$I,000,000 in sales. Id.
17. Id. at 254, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 861. If the account was not in Khanna's sales territory,
Khanna was to have six months to close the account. However, if the account was in Khanna's
territory the assignment was to last indefinitely; the assignment of the Van Waters and Rogers
account was in Khanna's territory. The letter also provided that if there was a sales split be-
tween Microdata and ESCOM, a sales company through which Microdata had a preexisting
sales agreement, then Khanna was to receive a hardware commission at a rate of four percent.
If, however, Microdata was able to arrange an agreement with Van Waters and Rogers without
a third party, Khanna was to receive a commission according to the compensation plan in
effect at the time the deal was closed. Id.
18. Id. at 255, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
19. Id.
20. Id. Khanna was told to cease work on the account because Microdata and ESCOM
had reached a final agreement whereby ESCOM was to sell Microdata computers to Van Waters
and Rogers and ESCOM was to supply the software. Id.
21. Id.
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Rogers account, but told Khanna to "just forget about the July 12th
letter.'" 2
Khanna continued to work diligently for Microdata while attemp-
ting to get a settlement on the unpaid commission.23 After failing
to obtain compensation under the prior agreement Khanna instituted
his first civil action against Microdata.24 This first lawsuit, however,
was dropped after Khanna experienced difficulty with his attorney
and hired new counsel. 25 While Khanna was experiencing the difficulty
with his first attorney, Microdata terminated him.26 Khanna then filed
a second lawsuit against Microdata.27 The complaint included causes
of action for fraud, wrongful discharge, breach of the implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of the employment
contract.28 After trial the jury returned a general verdict in favor of
Khanna.2 9
22. Id.
23. Id. During this time, Khanna was shown a memo from the president of Microdata,
Rene Caron, dated November 7, 1978. The memo provided that Khanna was to receive 600
of the normal commission for direct sales of computers for the units that were sold to Van
Waters and Rogers and actually installed within Khanna's territory. This arrangement would
have given Khanna from 4.8%1o to 7.2% of the total sales price, but Khanna objected to the
arrangement as being contrary to the terms of the original July 12th letter. One sale was com-
pleted from ESCOM to Van Waters and Rogers in December 1978, which, under the terms
contained in the memo, would have given Khanna $4,785. Khanna was never credited with
the commission for this sale even though Microdata admitted that Khanna should have been
paid. Id.
24. Id. at 255-56, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 863. In November 1979, Khanna wrote to Rene Caron
stating that he was entitled to compensation under the letter of July 12, 1978. Caron answered
by saying that Microdata would not respect the terms of the July 12th letter but would respect
the November 7th memo. Khanna responded by noting that he had never agreed to the terms
of the memo and that the memo was issued unilaterally by Microdata. After the exchange
of correspondence with Caron, Khanna hired counsel in December 1978. Id.
25. Id. at 257, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 863. Khanna's attorney neglected to file the required
jury fees and the court ordered trial to proceed without a jury. After discovering the attorney's
error Khanna fired the lawyer and hired new counsel. Id.
26. Id. The termination letter from Rene Caron stated:
[T]ermination is necessary because of your inability to maintain what Microdata con-
siders to be a normal employee relationship. Your actions in bringing suit against
Microdata based on totally unfounded representations as to commitments of Microdata
and its personnel can only be construed as disloyalty. Such disloyalty cannot be
permitted.
Id.
27. Id. at 257, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 864. At the time of his dismissal Khanna had pending
commissions on nearly $250,000 worth of sales and leases for computers ordered but not yet
delivered. According to the agreement signed by Khanna, any pending commission that existed
at the time of the termination of the employment was forfeited to Microdata regardless of
the reason for the termination of employment. The court noted that all sales personnel were
required to sign the agreement and were not given a choice of negotiating more favorable terms.
Khanna was unsuccessful in getting compensation for these sales or for the previous sale to
Van Waters and Rogers. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 257-58, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 864.
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B. The Opinion
The California Court of Appeal affirmed the jury verdict in favor
of Khanna, holding that the verdict was supported by the cause of
action alleging breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. 0 First, the justices found that Khanna was an at-will
employee. 3 The court noted that the traditional theory allowing the
discharge of an at-will employee for any reason had been modified
by case law.32 The court cited several cases and found three distinct
sources of liability for wrongful discharge.33 The three approaches
are: (1) a tort cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation
of public policy, 34 (2) a cause of action for the employer's breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, sounding in
tort and contract, 3 and (3) a cause of action for employer's breach
of an implied-in-fact covenant to terminate only for good cause.36
Although the Khanna court found that the facts in the case could
sustain any of the three actions, the court nevertheless limited the
discussion to the cause of action based on the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.37
The opinion recognized that the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing was implied in every employment contract.38 Citing Cleary
v. American Airlines, Inc., the court noted that a cause of action
for violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing could
sound in tort.4" The justices, however, rejected the contention by the
defense that Cleary required a showing that the employee had been
satisfactorily employed for a long period, and that the company had
an express company policy indicating a duty to discharge only for
good cause. "1 The court held that the two factors relied upon in Cleary
30. Id. at 258, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 864.
31. See id. at 259, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 865. An at-will employee is someone employed for
an indefinite term whereby either party may terminate the employment at will. CAL. LAB. CODE
§2922 (definition of terminable at-will employment contract). See also infra notes 50-57 and
accompanying text (discussing the at-will employment contract).
32. Khanna, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 259, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 865. The court cited two primary
cases, Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839
(1980) and Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980),
as demonstrating the judicially recognized limits to the discharge of an at-will employee. Id.
33. Khanna, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 259, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 865.
34. Id. (citing Tameny, 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980)).
35. Id. (citing Cleary, I11 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980)).
36. Id. (citing Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981)).
37. Id. at 260, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 865.
38. Id. at 261-62, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 866-67.
39. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
40. Khanna, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 262, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
41. Id.
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were not required to establish a breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. 2
Relying on two cases, 3 the court found that the cause of action
could be sustained upon a showing that Microdata had exercised bad
faith, extraneous to the contract, and had fired Khanna with the in-
tention of frustrating Khanna's enjoyment of the employment con-
tract.44 The court found that Cleary had only provided one set of
circumstances among many that would allow recovery by a wrongfully
discharged employee.4 5 The justices also noted that the factual ques-
tion of whether an employee has been dismissed in bad faith with
the intent to deprive the employee of the benefits of the employment
contract is an evidentiary question to be resolved by the jury.46
Finally, the court decided that ample evidence supported the con-
clusion that Microdata had breached the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing by firing Khanna in retaliation for his lawsuit
against Microdata.4 7 The justices noted that Khanna was a highly rated
salesman at the time of discharge, that Microdata had saved several
thousand dollars in earned but unpaid commissions as a result of
Khanna's dismissal, and that Khanna was fired at a time when
Microdata may have thought that Khanna would abandon his lawsuit.
4 8
The court stressed that this evidence established the existence of bad
faith on the part of Microdata and concluded that the evidence was
sufficient to support the jury verdict.49
42. Id. The California Court of Appeal for the Second District has recently handed down
a decision disagreeing with the position of Khanna. The Second District Court held that the
factors relied upon by the court in Cleary were required for a cause of action based upon
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See Foley v. Interactive Data
Corp., 174 Cal. App. 3d 282, 219 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1985).
43. Sawyer v. Bank of America NT&SA, 83 Cal. App. 3d 135, 145 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1978);
Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613 (1984).
In Sawyer, the California First District Court of Appeal was the first to state "the tort of
breaching an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing consists in bad faith action,
extraneous to the contract, with the motive intentionally to frustrate the obligee's enjoyment
of contract rights." Sawyer, 83 Cal. App. 3d at 139, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 625. In Shapiro, the
California Court of Appeal for the Second District cited Sawyer and applied the concept of
action extraneous to the contract with intent to frustrate directly to employment contracts.
Shapiro, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 478-79, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
44. Khanna, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 262, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 263, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 868. On appeal the question is whether substantial evidence
exists to support the jury finding of bad faith action by the employer. Id.
47. Id. at 263-64, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
48. Id. at 264, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
49. Id. In reaching this conclusion the court did not address the other causes of action.
Id. at 258, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 864.
50. Union Labor Hosp. Ass'n v. Vance Redwood Lumber Co., 158 Cal. 551, 554-55, 112
P. 886, 888 (1910); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 172, 610 P.2d 1330,
1332, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 841 (1980). See Comment, The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. At-Will Employment Contracts
Common law provided that an employment contract for an
unspecified term was terminable at will by either employer or
employee." The at-will concept was derived from the theory of
mutuality of obligation.5 t The courts reasoned that if an employee
could terminate the employment at any time, the employer should
also have that right.12 Therefore, an employer was allowed to discharge
an employee for cause, no cause, or bad cause." California codified
the common law approach in an apparent attempt to allow the
discharge of an employee for any reason." '
While recognizing the codification of the common law at-will doc-
trine, the California courts have been unwilling to view the statute
as authority for an employer discharging an employee for any reason."
Early employment cases limited the right to discharge an employee
Dealing: A Common Ground for the Torts of Wrongful Discharge From Employment, 21 SANTA
CLA L. REv. 1111, 1116-19 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Comment, A Common Ground];
Comment, Recognizing the Employee's Interests in Continued Employment-The California
Cause of Action for Unjust Dismissal, 12 PAc. L.J. 69, 69-70 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Com-
meht, The California Cause of Action]; Comment, Wrongful Termination of Employees at
Will; The California Trend, 78 Nw. U.L. Rv. 259, 259, 261-65 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
Comment, Wrongful Termination].
51. Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 448, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722,
725 (1980); Comment, A Common Ground, supra note 50, at 1118, 1121-24; Comment, "Good
Cause": California's New "Exception" to the At-Will Employment Doctrine, 23 Santa Clara
L. Rev. 263, 263 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Comment, "Good Cause"]; Comment, The Califor-
nia Cause of Action, supra note 50, at 74-75; Comment, Wrongful Termination, supra note
50, at 263.
52. Union Labor Hosp. Ass'n, 158 Cal. at 554, 112 P. at 888; Marin v. Jacuzzi, 224
Cal. App. 2d 549, 553, 36 Cal. Rptr. 880, 883 (1964); Mallard v. Boring, 182 Cal. App, 2d
390, 394, 6 Cal. Rptr. 171, 174 (1960). See Cleary, I11 Cal. App. 3d at 448-49, 168 Cal.
Rptr. at 725; Comment, A Common Ground, supra note 50, at 1118, 1121-24; Comment, "Good
Cause", supra note 51, at 263; Comment, The California Cause of Action, supra note 50,
at 74-75; Comment, Wrongful Termination, supra note 50, at 263.
53. Union Labor Hosp. Ass'n, 158 Cal. at 554, 112 P. at 888 (stating, "as may the employee
cease labor at his whim or pleasure, and, whatever be his reason, good, bad, or indifferent,
.. so .... may the employer discharge, and, whatever be his reason, good, bad, or indif-
ferent"); Marin, 224 Cal. App. 2d at 553, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 883 (noting, "his employer can
discharge him at any time, with or without cause"); Mallard, 182 Cal. App. 2d at 394, 6
Cal. Rptr. at 174. Discharge by employer was allowed even though the reason for discharge
was "quite reprehensible." See Comment, A Common Ground, supra note 50, at 1118.
54. California Labor Code §2922 states:
An employment having no specified term, may be terminated at the will of either
party on notice to the other. Employment for a specified term means an employment
for a period greater than one month.
CAL. LAB. CODE §2922.
55. Tameny, 27 Cal. 3d at 172, 610 P.2d at 1332, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 84142. "[A]n employer
does not enjoy an absolute or totally unfettered right to discharge even an at-will employee."
Id. Cleary, Ill Cal. App. 3d at 450-54, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 726-28.
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by finding that statutes or considerations of public policy may pre-
vent indiscriminate dismissals by employers. 56 Three recent Califor-
nia cases have increased the protection afforded wrongfully discharged
employees by finding that a wrongful discharge may give rise to three
distinct causes of action.5 7
B. Wrongful Discharge in California
The first action for wrongful discharge was put forward in Tameny
v. Atlantic Richfield Co."8 Tameny sued Atlantic Richfield Company
(ARCO) after ARCO fired him for refusing to participate in an illegal
price-fixing scheme.5 9 The California Supreme Court allowed a tort
cause of action for wrongful discharge because ARCO discharged
Tameny in violation of public policy.6" Justice Tobriner, writing for
the court, concluded that an employer discharging an employee for
refusing to commit a criminal act was violating a basic duty imposed
by law on all employers and, therefore, the employee could maintain
a suit in tort.61
The same year that Tameny was decided, a California Court of
Appeal for the Second District rendered the decision in Cleary v.
American Airlines, Inc.62 Cleary had been employed by American
Airlines for eighteen years when he was discharged.63 Cleary sued
American Airlines alleging that American Airlines discharged him for
union activities, in violation of the policy of the airline governing
56. Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 188,
344 P.2d 25, 27 (1959) (limiting the right to discharge for reasons of public policy); Kouff
v. Bethleham-Alameda Shipyard, Inc., 90 Cal. App. 2d 322, 324, 202 P.2d 1059, 1060 (1949)
(limiting an employer's right to discharge when discharge is in violation of an express statutory
provision).
57. Tameny, 27 Cal. 3d at 178-79, 610 P.2d at 1336-37, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 846 (allowing
a tort cause of action when an employer discharged an employee in violation of public policy);
Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 321-22, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 922 (1981)
(allowing a cause of action when a discharge violated contractual terms whether implied or
express); Cleary, 111 Cal. App. 3d at 456, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729 (allowing a cause of action
for a discharge in breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing). Collectively,
Tameny, Pugh, and Cleary have been termed the "California Trilogy." See generally Miller
& Estes, Recent Judicial Limitations On the Right to Discharge; A California Trilogy, 16 U.C.D.
L. REv. 65 (1982).
58. 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980). See generally Miller &
Estes, supra note 57, at 67-83; Note, Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co.: Wrongful Discharge,
A New Tort to Protect At-Will Employees, 8 W.ST. U.L. REv. 91 (1980).
59. Tameny, 27 Cal. 3d at 169, 610 P.2d at 1330-31, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
60. Id. at 178-79, 610 P.2d at 1336-37, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 846.
61. Id.
62. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980). See generally Miller & Estes, supra
note 57, at 83-97.
63. Cleary, 111 Cal. App. 3d at 447-48, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 724-25.
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Pacific Law Journal / Vol.17
dismissals." The court, in finding that American Airlines could be
liable in tort for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, noted that two factors were of paramount importance
to the decision.6 5 The court stressed that Cleary had been employed
for several years and that American Airlines had an express company
policy which indicated that American Airlines recognized a duty to
discharge only for good cause."
A third cause of action for wrongful discharge in California was
established in Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc.67 Pugh, an employee for
thirty-two years, was discharged without a stated reason." In reversing
a lower court dismissal of the action, the California Court of Appeal
for the First District held that an employee could be dismissed only
for good cause upon a finding of an implied or express promise not
to discharge without good cause.6 9 The court found enough evidence
for the jury to find an implied promise not to discharge except for
good cause.70 The court, therefore, concluded that it was error for
the lower court to dismiss the action on a nonsuit.7'
C. The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
For several years California courts have recognized that an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing exists in contractual relation-
ships. 72 The earliest cases to recognize this concept were insurance
cases in which the courts found three reasons for imposition of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 7 The courts in these
64. Id. American Airlines claimed that Cleary was fired because of theft from the com-
pany, absence from his workplace, and threats of bodily harm made to a fellow employee.
Id. at 447, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 724.
65. Id. at 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
66. Id.
67. 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981). See generally Miller & Estes, supra
note 57, at 97-102.
68. Pugh, 116 Cal. App. 3d at 315-19, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 918-20. Pugh testified that he
thought he was fired because he objected to the company signing a "sweetheart contract" with
a union. The president of See's Candies, who fired Pugh, told him to "look deep within himself
to find the answer," and that "[t]hings were said by people in the trade that have come back
to us." Id.
69. Id. at 326, 329, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 925, 927.
70. Id. at 329, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 927. The factors relied upon by the court were longevity
of employment, commendations, promotions, lack of criticism, assurances, and acknowledged
employer policies. Id.
71. Id.
72. Cumunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 658, 328 P.2d 198, 200
(1958); Brown v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 2d 559, 564, 212 P.2d 878, 881 (1949). See I B.
WrrKIN, SUMMIARY OF CALIFORNYA LAW, Contracts §576 (8th ed. 1973 and Supp. 1984).
73. Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 820-21, 598 P.2d 452, 457-58,
1020
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cases found that a fiduciary relationship existed between the insurance
company and the insured, that the contract entered into by the in-
sured was an adhesion contract, and that the insurance industry has
a special obligation to the public.74 The courts noted, however, that
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing exists in every
contract, not just insurance contracts."'
Recently, courts have recognized that many of the factors involved
in insurance cases are similar to those present in other contracts.76
California courts have concluded that the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing also is found in certain employment contracts."
In particular, Tameny and Cleary have recognized that a breach by
an employer of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
could give rise to a tort cause of action by the discharged employee.
7 1
D. At-Will Employment and the Covenant of Good Faith and
Fair Dealing
Tameny was the first California case to recognize that an employer
could be liable for wrongful discharge of an employee in breach of
157 Cal. Rptr. 482, 487-88 (1979); Note, Defining Public Policy Torts in At-Will Dismissals,
34 STAN. L. REv. 153, 164 (1981). See Comment, "Good Cause", supra note 51, at 275-76.
74. Egan, 24 Cal. 3d at 820-21, 598 P.2d 452, 457-58, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 487-88; Note,
supra note 73, at 164.
75. Cumunale, 50 Cal. 2d at 658, 328 P.2d at 200. The court stated:
There is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract that
neither party will do anything which will injure the right of the other party to receive
the benefits of the agreement.
Id. (emphasis added). The California Supreme Court also has stated: "It is well settled that,
in California, the law implies in every contract a covenant of good faith and fair dealing."
Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 768, 686 P.2d 1158,
1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 362 (1984). See Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman v. Cohen, 146 Cal.
App. 3d 200, 215, 194 Cal. Rptr. 180, 188 (1983). Even nonfiduciaries must exercise their
rights in good faith and fair dealing so as not to injure the rights of the other. Id.
76. Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc., 36 Cal. 3d at 769, 686 P.2d at 1166, 206 Cal.
Rptr. at 362 (stating in dictum, "[nio doubt there are other relationships with ... characteristics
[similar to those in insurance contracts] and deserving of similar legal treatment"); Wallis v.
Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, 1116-19, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123, 127-29 (1984) (finding
a noncompetition contract between a former employee and his ex-employer analogous to in-
surance cases). See Comment, A Common Ground, supra note 50, at 1142-48 (finding that
insurance contracts and employment contracts are analogous). But cf. Note, supra note 73,
at 165-67 (finding no correlation between insurance contracts and employment contracts).
77. Rulon-Miller v. IBM, 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 247-48, 208 Cal. Rptr. 524, 529 (1984);
Cancellier v. Federated Dept. Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1318 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 859 (1982); Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., II Cal. App. 3d 443, 455, 168 Cal. Rptr.
722, 729 (1980).
78. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 179 n.12, 610 P.2d 1330, 1337
n.12, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 846 n.12 (1980) (dictum); Cleary, 111 Cal. App. 3d at 456, 168
Cal. Rptr. at 729; see infra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
1021
Pacific Law Journal / Vol.17
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing." In holding the
employer liable for wrongful discharge, the California Supreme Court,
in a footnote, suggested that a tort cause of action could be based
upon breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing."0 With the footnote in Tameny as authority, a California Court
of Appeal in Cleary expressly recognized the doctrine of wrongful
discharge based upon breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing.8 ' The Cleary court emphasized that Cleary's long
employment, coupled with the employment policy of American
Airlines, acted as a form of estoppel to preclude dismissal without
just cause.8" The court, however, did not make clear whether the im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing existed only because
of the presence of these two critical factors or whether the covenant
could exist independently in the terminable at-will employment con-
tract alone.83
Several cases since Cleary have discussed causes of action based
upon breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
by an employer.8 " In Newfield v. Insurance Company of the West,"3
a California Court of Appeal made special note that the cause of
action could not be based upon a "naked covenant" alone.8 6 The
Newfield court found that causes of action for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing always were predicated upon
79. Tameny, 27 Cal. 3d at 179 n.12, 610 P.2d at 1337 n.12, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 846 n.12
(dictum).
80. Id. The Supreme Court stated:
We do note in this regard, however, that authorities in other jurisdictions have on
occasion found an employer's discharge of an at-will employee violative of the
employer's "good faith and fair dealing" obligations . . .and past California cases
have held that a breach of this implied-at-law covenant sounds in tort as well as
in contract.
Id. (citations omitted).
81. Cleary, 111 Cal. App. 3d at 455-56, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
82. Id. at 456, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
83. See id. at 454-56, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729. See also Pugh, 116 Cal. App. 3d at 329,
171 Cal. Rptr. at 927 (holding that Cleary did not rest solely on a finding of breach of the
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
.84. For decisions rendered after Cleary that have recognized the cause of action for breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing see Khanna v. Microdata Corp., 170
Cal. App. 3d 250, 258, 215 Cal. Rptr. 860, 864 (1985); Rulon-Miller v. IBM, 162 Cal. App.
3d 241, 247-48, 208 Cal. Rptr. 524, 529 (1984); Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152
Cal. App. 3d 467, 475-79, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613, 613-20 (1984).
85. 156 Cal. App. 3d 440, 203 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1984).
86. Id. at 445, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 12. "Naked covenant" refers to the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing alone, without regard to any other obligation such as public
policy, statute, or contract. See id. See also Pugh, 116 Cal. App. 3d at 329, 171 Cal. Rptr.
at 927 (finding that the decision in Cleary did not rest solely on breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing).
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public policy grounds, statutory violations, express or implied con-
tract grounds, or upon a combination of elements as the court found
in Cleary." Though apparently recognizing that factors other than
those used in Cleary might sustain a cause of action," no court prior
to Khanna sustained a cause of action without the presence of the
Cleary factors. 9
III. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS
Khanna extends prior case law by modifying the requirements for
a wrongful discharge cause of action based upon breach of the im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing." To sustain a cause
of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing after Khanna, a wrongfully discharged employee will not be
required to plead the specific factors relied upon by the court in
Cleary." Unlike Cleary, Khanna clearly finds that the implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing exists in all employment con-
tracts including those terminable at-will.92 In concluding that breach
of the covenant alone gives rise to a cause of action, Khanna rests
only on the "naked covenant," not on any public policy, contractual
right, or statutory right. 93 The court in Khanna, while not referring
specifically to which factors were relied upon to find a breach of
the implied covenant, concluded that the factors present in the case
87. Newfield, 156 Cal. App. 3d at 445-46, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 12.
88. Shapiro, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 478-79, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 619-20. The California Court
of Appeal for the Second District found that the plaintiff was correct in asserting that factors
other than those present in Cleary could be alleged. The court, nevertheless, concluded that
the plaintiff had not pleaded enough facts to sustain his cause of action. Id.
89. See Rulon-Miller, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 247-51, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 529-32. An employee
maintained a cause of action based upon dismissal after 12 years service when the discharge
was in violation of company policy. Id.; Cancellier v. Federated Dept. Stores, 672 F.2d 1312,
1315, 1318 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982) (upholding a cause of action
by three employees discharged after 25, 18, and 17 years of employment, in violation of com-
pany policy). But see Shapiro, 152 Cal. App. 3d. at 478, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 619 (dismissing
cause of action by an employee who was employed for only three and one-half years and who
failed to allege that company policies were violated).
90. See Khanna, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 262, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 867 (finding that the factors
stated in Cleary are not the sine qua non to a cause of action for breach of the implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing). But see Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 174 Cal. App.
3d 282, 219 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1985) (holding that a cause of action based upon breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing must contain the factors cited in Cleary).
91. See id. at 262-64, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 867-69.
92. See id. at 262, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
93. See id. at 262-63, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 867-68. The court found that a cause of action
could be sustained upon a showing of bad faith action on the part of the employer, extraneous
to the employment contract, with the intent to frustrate the employee's enjoyment of the con-
tract. Id. at 262, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 867. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
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were enough to support a jury finding of bad faith on the part of
Microdata.9 '
The Khanna court indicated that breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing could be established when an employer
shows bad faith with an intent to frustrate the employee's enjoyment
of the contract." The opinion, though lacking specificity, indicates
that any combination of factors that establishes a bad faith discharge
with the intention of frustrating the employee's expectations may sup-
port a cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.9" The court further indicated that the question
whether the facts supported a showing of bad faith on the part of
the employer was an evidentiary question to be decided by the jury. 91
The precedent of this opinion, therefore, should prevent lower courts
from prematurely dismissing wrongful discharge actions provided the
employee can show some factual support for finding bad faith on
the part of the employer coupled with an intent to frustrate the
employee's contractual rights. 9
The effect of the decision in Khanna on employment in California
remains uncertain. 99 Employers may be justifiably concerned that
expanded liability for wrongful discharge will interfere with the abili-
ty of the employer to conduct business as the employer sees fit.' °°
The countervailing consideration, however, is that allowing the
employer to retain an unfettered ability to discharge an employee for
any reason is inherently inequitable.' The courts seem to prefer the
policy that some limit on the ability of an employer to discharge an
94. Id. at 264, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
95. Id. at 262, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
96. See id. at 262-63, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 867-68.
97. Id. at 263, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
98. See Id. at 262-64, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 867-69.
99. See Miller & Estes, supra note 57, at 103-04 (finding that the evolving doctrines of
wrongful discharge may make employers more formal and cautious in relations with employees);
Comment, Wrongful Termination, supra note 50, at 282-84 (noting that allowing causes of
action for wrongful discharge may cause employers to use less formal grievance procedures
to avoid the implication of a promise to be fair); Comment, "Good Cause", supra note 51
at 277 (noting that tempering the at-will rule will give the employee more benefits than the
employee is entitled); Note, supra note 73, at 170-72 (stating that the courts should not ques-
tion business judgments regarding when to discharge employees because the courts have no
expertise in that area).
100. Comment, A Common Ground, supra note 50, at 1124-26; Comment, The California
Cause of Action, supra note 50, at 79-80. See Note, supra note 73, at 170-72 (suggesting adop-
tion of a business judgment rule that would preclude judicial scrutiny of employee dismissals
without a finding of bad cause).
101. Khanna, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 259, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 865; Cleary, I11 Cal. App. 3d
at 448-49, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 725; Miller & Estes, supra note 57, at 85.
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employee must exist.' 0 2 Khanna solidifies the position of California
courts that an unjust dismissal of an employee without the exercise
of good faith and fair dealing will not be tolerated.'0 3
Commentators have suggested that the legislature, not the courts,
must define the parameters of causes of action for wrongful
discharge.' 4 In apparent recognition of the obligation of the legislature,
three separate bills have been considered in California, in the current
legislative session, to provide a statutory solution to the problem of
wrongful discharge.' 05 The expansive decision in Khanna might spur
the legislature to provide a statutory scheme governing wrongful
discharge actions in California.
CONCLUSION
The California Court of Appeal for the First District, in Khanna
v. Microdata Corp., upheld a lower court decision that allowed a
102. See Khanna, 170 Cal. App. 3d 250, 215 Cal. Rptr. 860 (1985); Pugh v. See's Candies,
Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981); Cleary, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168
Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164
Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980). At least one court has rejected approaches like the business judgment
rule. The California Court of Appeal for the Second District stated:
[The employer] urges the court to adopt a rule of just cause dismissal which would
preclude a review of the legitimacy of an employer's business reasons for discharging
an employee. This rule would parallel the business judgment rule which prevents judicial
scrutiny of the acts of corporate directors using honest judgment. We decline to adopt
such a rule. An implied in fact or implied in law promise to dismiss an employee
only for cause would be illusory if the employer were permitted to be the sole judge
and final arbiter of the propriety of the policy giving rise to the discharge. If we
were to adopt such a rule, an employer could implement a patently absurd business
poliiy carapaced from judicial inquiry.
Crosier v. UPS, 150 Cal. App. 3d 1132, 1140, 198 Cal. Rptr. 361, 366 (1983).
103. See Khanna, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 258-64, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 864-69. See also Miller
& Estes, sdpra note 57, at 104. The authors stated:
Without a doubt these three causes of action [as defined in Tameny, Pugh, and Cleary]
have eroded the former rule in California that employment contracts for unspecified
terms may be terminated at-will, and we may assume that further judicial application
of the Cleary-Tameny-Pugh trilogy will clarify the extent of this trend.
Id.
104. See Comment, "Good Cause", supra note 51, at 284-89 (finding that the judicial creation
of exceptions to the at-will rule is a usurpation of legislative authority). But cf. Comment,
The California Cause of Action, supra note 50, at 78 (finding judicially created rules necessary
to protect against inequities of majority rule).
105. See S.B. 1348, 1985-86 Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., 1985 Cal. Laws - ; A.B. 1400, 1985-86
Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., 1985 Cal. Laws -; A.B. 2800, 1985-86 Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess., 1986
Cal. Laws -. Of the three bills considered in the 1985/1986 legislative session only Assembly
Bill 2800 is still viable. Both Senate Bill 1348 and Assembly Bill 1400 died in committee. Assembly
Bill 1400 would override specifically case law exceptions to the at-will doctrine. The bill would
allow an employee some redress if the employee was terminated in violation of public policy
or if the employee was fired without good cause. To qualify for redress under good cause,
however, the employee must have worked for an employer for five years and for at least 1,000
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wrongful discharge tort claim based upon breach of the implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing. In sustaining the cause of action
the Court of Appeal rejected the employer's contention that the
employee must have been employed for a long term and that the com-
pany had to have a company policy regarding dismissals. By con-
cluding that these factors were not the sine qua non for a cause of
action based upon breach of the covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing, the court made a further evolutionary step regarding the tort
of wrongful discharge.
This note first examined the decision given by the Court of Appeal
in Khanna. Next, the historical background of tort recovery for
wrongful discharge based upon breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing was reviewed. Finally, the possible legal
ramifications of Khanna were explored in the hope of measuring the
impact of the decision.
John M. Felder
hours per year. The employee would have the burden of proof in all causes of action under
Assembly Bill 2800 and the damages would be limited to back pay. The bill also makes provi-
sions for arbitration. A.B. 2800, 1985-86 Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess., 1986 Cal. Laws -. Assembly
Bill 2800 was a copy of Assembly Bill 1400 and introduced after Assembly Bill 1400 had died
in committee. Compare A.B. 2800, 1985-86 Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess., 1986 Cal. Laws - with
A.B. 1400, 1985-86 Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., 1985 Cal. Laws _. If Senate Bill 1348 had been
enacted, California Labor Code §2922 would have been repealed and an employee could have
been discharged only for just cause with the burden of proof on the employer. The legislation
also provided for binding arbitration and a limiting of damages to a maximum of two years
pay. S.B. 1348, 1985-86 Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., 1985 Cal. Laws _. At time of publication,
Assembly Bill 2800 had not passed either house of the state legislature.
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